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1 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Kody Dean Feltman

appeals from his convictions for felony propelling bodily

ﬂuids and misdemeanor second offense DUI.

Statement

Of The

The

Facts

charged Feltman with felony propelling bodily ﬂuids and misdemeanor

state

second offense DUI.
that the

And Course Of The Proceedings

(R., pp. 55-58, 76-79.) Prior to trial

Feltman ﬁled a motion requesting

“element 0f the crime that the defendant’s status be either that of a sentenced

prisoner or a pretrial detainee” be included in the jury instructions regarding the propelling

bodily ﬂuids count. (R., pp. 80-85, 87-90; 8/27/18
a “pretrial detainee”

is

“different

Tr., p. 5, Ls. 6-9.)

Feltman argued

that

from an arrestee” and the jury should be required

to

determine Whether he was a pretrial detainee 0r an arrestee, and that the statute only applies
t0 the former.

(8/27/18 Tr., p. 3, L. 15

Feltman argued that he was not a

— p.

4, L. 3; p. 5, L.

pretrial detainee,

20 —

p. 7, L. 9.)

Speciﬁcally,

and therefore within the scope 0f the

propelling bodily ﬂuids statute, until there had been a “probable cause determination.”

— p.

(8/27/18 Tr., p. 7, L. 10

initially

10, L.

8, L. 12;

8/28/18 Tr., p. 6, L. 2 —p.

8, L. 25.)

district court

determined that the proposed instruction was “not appropriate.” (8/27/18

22 —

p. 13, L. 10.)

statute, that “it is

The

district court ultimately ruled,

Tr., p.

based on the language of the

not incumbent upon the State to prove [Feltman] was a sentenced prisoner

0r a pretrial detainee,” but that the state must prove only that “he

was

being transported or supervised by a correctional ofﬁcer.” (8/28/18

The

The

district court

gave

that the jury determine

at trial

a person

who was

Tr., p. 13, Ls. 3-25.)

an elements instruction that did not include any requirement

whether Feltman was a

pretrial detainee.

(R., p. 124.)

At

trial

the prosecution, based

on the defense’s opening statements, objected

presentation 0f evidence of Feltman’s mental illness. (8/29/18 Tr., p.1 18, Ls. 13-22.)

defense represented that
testiﬁed, t0 ask

it

him whether he had been hospitalized and diagnosed with bipolar disorder,

Feltman’s behavior was not the result ofbeing drunk. (8/29/18

was

The

did not intend to present any experts, but intended, ifFeltman

expecting that Feltman would deny having been so diagnosed, in order to

L. 13.)

t0

The prosecutor

initially

acknowledged

that

Tr., p. 118, L.

Feltman could

show

23 —

testify that his

that

p. 121,

behavior

the result 0f mental illness and not intoxication,1 but objected to Feltman testifying

about “his

own diagnosis.”

(8/29/18 TL, p. 121, L. 16

— p.

122, L. 3.)

The prosecutor

also

objected to the relevance of mental illness t0 the propelling bodily ﬂuids charge, which

would suggest an improper

insanity defense.

(8/29/18 Tr., p. 122, Ls. 4-13.)

The

district

court ruled that “unless the Defense has an expert Witness,” evidence 0f mental illness

“including the Defendant offering testimony as t0 what his diagnosis is”
(8/29/18 Tr., p. 123, L. 6

The evidence
the

— p.

at trial

Who was

trying t0

inadmissible.

124, L. 9.)

showed

(8/29/18 Tr., p. 129, L. 20

jail.

was

that

—

Feltman was arrested for

p. 130, L. 24.)

remove Feltman from the police

141, L. 2; p. 147, Ls. 14-16; p. 183, L. 8

— p.

At

car.

the

jail,

DUI and transported t0
Feltman

spit

on a jailer

(8/29/18 Tr., p. 136, L. 15

186, L. 3; State’s Exhibit

1

(Video ﬁle

—

p.

Howe

23 1 8-2502).)

The jury convicted 0n both

counts.

(R., p.

133.)

The

judgments on the convictions and Feltman ﬁled a timely appeal.

1

district court

entered

(R., pp. 197-210.)

The prosecutor withdrew this argument later and maintained evidence 0f mental
was inadmissible for even this purpose. (8/29/18 Tr., p. 125, Ls. 8-13.)
2

illness

ISSUES
Feltman
I.

states the issues

Did the

0n appeal

district court err

instructions

0n the

as:

by

rejecting

pretrial detainee

Mr. Feltman’s proposed jury
element 0f propelling bodily

ﬂuids?

II.

III.

Did the district court commit fundamental error by failing t0
0n the pretrial detainee element of propelling bodily ﬂuids?
Did

instruct

the State present sufﬁcient evidence t0 prove the pretrial

detainee element 0f propelling bodily ﬂuids?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by prohibiting Mr. Feltman
from testifying about his mental illness at the time of the alleged
offenses?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Feltman

failed to

show

insufﬁcient because there

is

error in the jury instructions 0r that the evidence is

n0

“pretrial detainee

element” in the propelling bodily

ﬂuids statute?
2.

Has Feltman

failed to

show that the

abused its discretion by ruling that
Feltman
was inadmissible?
by

district court

the evidence of mental illness proffered

ARGUMENT
I.

There
A.

Is

No

“Pretrial Detainee

Element” In The Propelling BodilV Fluids Statute

Introduction

The

district court ruled that “it is

not incumbent upon the State t0 prove that

[Feltman] was a sentenced prisoner 0r a pretrial detainee.” (8/28/18 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 20-22.)
Rather, the state’s burden

transported or supervised

was only

by a

detainee.

and the

9”

prove that Feltman “was a person

Who was

being

correctional ofﬁcer.” (8/28/18 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 22-24.)

Feltman argues that the
statute contains

t0

district court erred

because the propelling bodily ﬂuids

an “essential element that the defendant be

‘a

sentenced prisoner 0r pretrial

(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) Thus, he contends, the jury was improperly instructed

state’s

evidence

fails

on

this “essential element.”

However, a complete quote of the phrase

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-22.)

at issue is “irrespective

ofwhether the person

is

a sentenced prisoner 0r a pretrial detainee.” LC. § 18-915B (emphasis added).) Because

Felton

is

detainee

guilty “irrespective of whether” he

is

“The
D.A.F.

a pretrial detainee, his status as pretrial

not an “essential element” 0f the crime.

Standard

B.

is

Of Review

interpretation of a statute

V. Lieteau,

Idaho

_,

_

is

P.3d

a question 0f law and

is

reviewed de nova.”

_, No. 46026, 2019 WL 4924954,

at

*2 (Oct.

7,

2019). “This Court exercises free review over the propriety ofjury instructions.”

V.

Bodenbach,

_

Idaho

_, 448 P.3d 1005,

1012 (2019).

“When

m

a criminal defendant

challenges the sufﬁciency of the evidence supporting a judgment of conviction entered

upon a jury verdict, the relevant inquiry is not Whether this Court would ﬁnd the defendant

guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt but whether

after

Viewing the evidence in the

light

most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 0f fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State

447 P.3d 895, 899 (2019)

(internal quotations

Schiermeier, 165 Idaho 447,

V.

and brackets omitted, emphasis

original).

Did Not Need To Prove Feltman Was A “Pretrial Detainee” Because He
Was Guilty “Irrespective” Of Whether He Was A Pretrial Detainee

The

C.

State

“Statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s plain language.” State V. Brand,

162 Idaho 189, 191, 395 P.3d 809, 811 (2017). “Statutory interpretation begins With the
literal

language of the statute and provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be

interpreted in the context 0f the entire document.”

_

Idaho

_,

448 P.3d 1020, 1024 (2019)

Edwards

V.

Idaho Transportation Dep’t,

(internal quotations omitted).

“Where

the

legislature has not provided a deﬁnition in the statute, terms in the statute are given their

common, everyday meanings.”
1189 (2007).

“When

State V. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 477, 163 P.3d 1183,

the statute’s language

expressed intent must be given effect, and

is

we d0

unambiguous, the

legislature’s clearly

not need to g0 beyond the statute’s plain

language t0 consider other rules of statutory construction.”

State V. Osborn,

Idaho

_, 449 P.3d 419, 421 (2019).
Unlike most criminal

statutes,

Which apply

to

all

persons

Who commit

the

prohibited act, the propelling bodily ﬂuid statute applies only to a limited class 0f
defendants: those

who

transported 0r supervised

was thus required
0r supervised

by a

t0

are “housed” in a jail or correctional facility or are “being

by a correctional or detention officer.” LC.

prove only that Feltman was a “person”

correctional ofﬁcer or detention officer,”

§

who was

Which

it

18-9 1 5B.

The

state

“being transported

did.

(8/29/18 T11, p.

136, L. 15

—p.

(Video ﬁle

Howe

ﬁnd

that

141, L. 2; p. 147, Ls. 14—16; p. 183, L. 8

—p.

186, L. 3; State’s Exhibitl

2318-2502).) Moreover, the jury was properly instructed that

it

had

t0

Feltman “was being transported 0r supervised by a correctional ofﬁcer or

detention officer.” (R., p. 124.)

The

statute then speciﬁcally provides that

“transported” or “supervised”

Whether the person

is

by a jailer)

is

such a person (one “housed” in a jail or

within the ambit of the statute “irrespective of

a sentenced prisoner or a pretrial detainee.” I.C. § 18-915B. Giving

the language 0f the statute

plain

its

meaning} Feltman was Within

the ambit of the statute

without respect to or regardless 0f whether he was a sentenced prisoner 0r a pretrial
detainee.

As

correctly stated

rather than “narrow[s]”

class

of inmate.

it

by

the district court, this language “broaden[s] the statute”

by making sure

that

its

(8/28/18 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 9—25.)

application

is

not limited t0 a particular

Rather than an “essential element,” the

language of the statute speciﬁcally excludes consideration of Feltman’s status as sentenced
prisoner or pretrial detainee.

Felton argues that the district court erred under the plain language 0f the statute.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.)
“irrespective 0f Whether”

is,

Speciﬁcally, he ﬁrst argues that the statutory language

by a couple of convolutions, synonymous with “whether or

not”; that such phrases generally

modify “the sentence’s main verb”; and therefore the

phrase in question means that “[n]either category [sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee]

2

The Merriam-Webster deﬁnition of “irrespective”

is

“functioning Without or having n0

regard for persons, conditions, circumstances, or consequences.” https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionarv/irrespective. The Dictionary.com deﬁnition is: “without regard to

something

by

0f).”

deﬁnition

else, especially

something speciﬁed; ignoring 0r discounting (usually followed

https://www.dictionarv.com/browse/irrespective.
is:

“without

considering;

not

The Cambridge Dictionary

needing

https://dictionarv.cambridge.0rg/us/dictionarv/english/irrespective.

6

to

allow

for.”

changes the person’s liability.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.) Setting aside whether
substituting the language used by the legislature for allegedly synonymous language is a
proper analysis of the plain language of the statute, it is hard to argue with the conclusion
that the legislature intended that “neither category”—sentenced prisoner or pretrial
detainee—”changes the person’s liability.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.) Indeed, that
Feltman’s status as sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee did not change his liability is the
state’s argument and the district court’s analysis.
Felton’s argument seems to be lacking a logical step, namely how a conclusion that
“[n]either category changes the person’s liability” leads to the conclusion that one of the
categories is an “essential element” of the crime. If the legislature meant that the person
must be either a sentenced prisoner or a pretrial detainee, and excluded other classes of
persons in custody of prison officers or jailers, it would have simply said so. The language
“irrespective of whether” is language that excludes consideration of whether the person is
a sentenced prisoner or pretrial detainee, not language that demands such consideration.
Felton next argues that “the entire ‘irrespective’ phrase modifies the initial
reference to ‘[a]ny person who is housed … or who is being transported or supervised.’”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 11 (quoting I.C. § 18-915B).) Again, the state generally agrees. The
determination of whether Felton was a person housed in a jail or being transported or
supervised as a jailer is to be made “irrespective of whether the person is a sentenced
prisoner or a pretrial detainee.” I.C. § 18-915B. Felton simply disingenuously omits the
“irrespective of whether” language from the analysis portion of his argument and asserts
that the “person” within the ambit of the statute must be “a sentenced prisoner or pretrial
detainee.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) This simply ignores the statutory language.

7

The

“who

is

statute limits the

housed” or “Who

is

scope 0f “[a]ny person” by stating that

being transported or supervised.”

then limit the scope to a person

18-915B. Rather, a person “who

§

is

is”

“irrespective of Whether the person

§

’7 CC

“Who

must be a person

18-915B.

It

does not

a sentenced prisoner 0r a pretrial detainee.” LC.

housed or supervised

is

I.C. §

it

is

in the

ambit of the statute

a sentenced prisoner 0r a pretrial detainee.”

LC.

18—915B. Stated simply, a person’s status as a sentenced prisoner 0r pretrial detainee

excluded from consideration, and thus “[n]either category changes the person’s

is

liability.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)

Feltman argues the phrase “irrespective 0f Whether” means
consider whether Felton
plain language

statute

by

is

is

the opposite: Feltman falls Within the class 0f person in the ambit 0f the

Virtue 0f being “transported 0r supervised

18-915B. The

must

“a sentenced prisoner or a pretrial detainee.” The express and

ofﬁcer, irrespective 0f whether [he]

§

that the jury

district court

is

consideration of whether Felton

correctional ofﬁcer or detention

a sentenced prisoner or a pretrial detainee.”

did not err in

the verdict, because Whether Felton

by a

its

was a

was within

LC.

jury instructions, and the evidence supports

pretrial detainee is expressly

excluded from

the ambit of the statute.

II.

Feltman Has Failed T0 Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Ruling
That The Evidence Of Mental Illness Proffered BV Feltman Was Inadmissible
A.

Introduction

During opening statement, defense counsel asserted

breakdown” during which he “thought
being possessed 0r attacked by devils

that

at the

that

Feltman “had a mental

he was Jesus Christ” and “believed he was

time 0f this incident,” and that the jury would

hear Feltman’s statements substantiating this

when they watched the Video of the

incident.

(8/29/18 Tr., p. 104, L. 20 – p. 105, L. 3; p. 106, Ls. 6-15.) The prosecution later objected
to the defense presenting evidence that Feltman suffered from a mental illness as indicated
by the opening statement. (8/29/18 Tr., p.118, Ls. 13-22.) The defense argued that such
evidence would provide “an alternate explanation” for why Feltman was combative and
“saying crazy things,” to rebut the implication that it was because he was drunk. (8/29/18
Tr., p. 119, Ls. 5-9; p. 120, Ls. 8-15.) Defense counsel pointed out that the evidence of
Feltman’s mental illness was “going to come out anyway” through his bizarre statements
and behavior in the video of the encounter. (8/29/18 Tr., p. 119, Ls. 10-11.) “And if Mr.
Feltman testifies, you’re going to get a whole lot of it. Not deliberately, but it is going to
have to—” (8/29/18 Tr., p. 119, Ls. 11-13 (ending of sentence original).) Defense counsel
then acknowledged that the defense was not proposing presenting experts who would
“testify that the Defendant is mentally ill” and directly stated that although Feltman has a
diagnosis of bipolar disorder, if he testified he “would probably deny it.” (8/29/18 Tr., p.
119, Ls. 14-23.) Defense counsel then stated that, “if Mr. Feltman testifies, I was thinking
about asking him about [how] he went to State Hospital for a few months where he was
diagnosed with this disorder.” (8/29/18 Tr., p. 120, Ls. 22-25 (emphasis added).) The
district court ruled that “unless the Defense has an expert witness” to testify about mental
illness, evidence of mental illness “including the Defendant offering testimony as to what
his diagnosis is” was inadmissible. (8/29/18 Tr., p. 123, L. 6 – p. 124, L. 9.)
On appeal Feltman argues that the district court abused its discretion and his own
testimony regarding his diagnosis was admissible. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-28.) This
argument fails because it is inadequately preserved and, if the merits are considered, the
district court properly held that the evidence was inadmissible.

9

Standard

B.

Of Review

“‘The question of Whether evidence
decision t0 admit relevant evidence

Sanchez, 165 Idaho 563,

(Ct.

“A party may

reviewed de novo, while the

_, 448 P.3d 991, 1000 (2019) (quoting State

App. 1993)

Feltman’s Offer

C.

is

reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion.”

is

744, 781, 419 P.3d 1042, 1079 (2018)).

864 P.2d 654, 657

relevant

is

ﬂ

State V.

163 Idaho

V. Hall,

also State V. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819,

(citations omitted).

Of Proof Does Not Show Admissible Evidence

claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only

affects a substantial right

of the party and

...,

if the ruling

if the error

excludes evidence, a party

informs the court 0f its substance by an offer 0f proof, unless the substance was apparent

from the context.”
646

(Ct.

I.R.E. 103(a).

E

State V. Stone, 154 Idaho 949, 959, 303 P.3d 636,

App. 2013) (“The Idaho Rules of Evidence require

exclusion 0f evidence, the ‘substance 0f the evidence was
0r

was apparent from

0f proof

is

t0

make

that

when

appealing an

made known to the court by offer

the context....”’ (quoting I.R.E. 103(a)(2).)

“The purpose of an

offer

a record either for appeal or t0 enable the court to rule on the

m

admissibility 0f proffered evidence.” State V. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 82, 175 P.3d 764, 771

(2007).

An

insufﬁcient offer of proof fails to preserve the issue for appeal.

Coldwell Banker Landmark,

Inc.,

150 Idaho 240, 251, 245 P.3d 992, 1003 (2010).

Defense counsel represented that the defense did not intend
Feltman’s mental
“ask[]

state.

to call experts

Rather, counsel stated that “if Mr. Feltman testifies” counsel

him about [how] he went t0

bipolar disorder, Which Feltman

State Hospital for a

10

—

would

few months” and his diagnosis with

would “probably deny.”

119, Ls. 21-23; p. 120, Ls. 8-15; p. 120, L. 22

on

(8/29/1 8 TL, p. 119, Ls. 5-13; p.

p. 121, L. 13.)

This offer ofproof does

show what evidence would have been presented, and therefore

not

was

error t0 exclude the

First, the

unknown

is

inadequate to

show

it

evidence.

presentation of any evidence

was contingent upon Felton choosing to

take

the stand. (8/29/18 Tr., p. 120, Ls. 22-25.) Felton chose not to take the stand, and did not

claim that choice was in any
193, L. 4

—

intended to

way motivated by the

p. 195, L. 22; p. 199, Ls. 8-12.)

testify,

district court’s ruling.

Had

(8/29/18 Tr., p.

the offer of proof been that Feltman

then he could have met his burden 0f presenting a record that the

evidence in question would have been presented. However, 0n this record he cannot meet
his

burden 0f showing that the evidence contained in his offer was in

because of the court’s

0n Feltman choosing

was insufﬁcient

in limine ruling.

t0 testify,

Because the

and Feltman chose not

Wished

t0

even

to ask, but

to testify, Feltman’s offer

if

he had taken the stand.

acknowledged

that Felton

state

E, gg, ICJI 202.

the Defense

is

of proof

what Feltman would ultimately

Counsel represented What questions he

might simply deny being mentally

(8/29/18 Tr., p. 119, Ls. 21-23; p. 120, Ls. 22-25.)

evidence.

0f proof was contingent

t0 create a record adequate for appellate review.

Second, the offer 0f proof does not actually

have testiﬁed

entire offer

fact not presented

The questions 0f counsel

ill.

are not

The district court speciﬁcally stated it was “unclear 0n Where

going with the issue of mental

illness.”

(8/29/18 Tr., p. 123, Ls. 15-17.)

“Given the vague and very limited offer of proof presented by defense counsel,
say that the proffered testimony was clearly admissible.”
410, 420, 3 P.3d 535, 545 (Ct. App. 2000).

Feltman’s

State V.

trial

questions he wished t0 ask, but speciﬁcally stated he did not

11

we

cannot

Konechny, 134 Idaho

counsel represented What

know what

testimony those

questions would elicit. As such, Feltman’s offer of proof did not establish what evidence
was at issue, and therefore failed to preserve this issue.
Even if it were proper to assume that Feltman would have taken the stand but for
the trial court’s ruling, and assumed that if asked he would have claimed to be bipolar,
Feltman has failed to show error. The district court concluded that I.C. § 18-207 prohibited
the admission of “evidence of mental illness.” (8/29/18 Tr., p. 124, Ls. 7-9.) That would
include “the Defendant offering testimony as to what his diagnosis is.” (8/29/18 Tr., p.
123, Ls. 19-21.) The court reasoned that the statute contemplated that when mental illness
evidence is presented in a criminal proceeding, it would be presented through experts, with
certain procedural steps that must be followed as a condition of admission of the expert’s
testimony. (8/29/18 Tr., p. 123, L. 6 – p. 124, L. 9.) The law supports the district court’s
ruling.
The statute cited by the district court provides that “[m]ental condition shall not be
a defense to any charge of criminal conduct.” I.C. § 18-207(1). However, nothing in the
statute barring mental condition as a defense “is intended to prevent the admission of expert
evidence on the issue of any state of mind which is an element of the offense, subject to
the rules of evidence.” I.C. § 18-207(3). The presentation of such expert testimony is
subject to specific procedural prerequisites to admissibility, such as notice, submission of
a written synopsis of expected testimony, a waiver of privileges, and submission to an
examination. I.C. § 18-207(4). The statute by its plain language establishes that mental
condition evidence is presented by expert testimony after compliance with certain
procedures. The district court correctly held that the proposed mental condition evidence,
whatever it might be, did not comply with the statute and was inadmissible.
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On appeal Feltman,

for the ﬁrst time, argues that “Idaho

Code

§

18-207 simply did

not apply, unless Mr. Feltman intended t0 call an expert to testify about his mental health.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 26.)

First, this issue

was not preserved. “[B]0th

0n the issue must be raised before the

party’s position

preserved for appeal.” State

n0 point before the

trial

V.

trial

court for

t0

it

court did Feltman take the position that I.C. § 18-207

119, Ls. 5-23; p. 120, L. 8

—

be properly

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). At

applicable legal standard, nor did he suggest a different legal standard.

district court for

the issue and the

p. 121, L. 13; p. 124, Ls. 10-23.)

On

was not

the

(8/29/18 Tr., p.

appeal he faults the

not “examin[ing] Whether Mr. Feltman’s testimony was permissible lay

witness testimony 0n a medical condition” (Appellant’s brief, p. 27), but the reason the
did not examine that issue

district court

cannot claim the

district court erred

is

condition

is

if preserved,

Feltman never requested it t0 do

by applying

applying a legal standard that he did not

Even

that

the standard argued

by the

so.

Feltman

parties

and not

raise.

Feltman’s argument

fails.

LC.

§

18-207

states that “[m]ental

not a defense” LC. § 18-2070), but this does not “prevent the admission of

expert evidence” LC. § 18-207(3), so long as certain procedural prerequisites are met, LC.

§

18-207(4).

Because mental

exclusionary reach 0f the statute,

state

state

it is

evidence from experts

admissible.

evidence from lay witnesses. The

No

district court

is

exempted from the

such exemption applies for mental

properly concluded the statute allows

expert testimony (under certain conditions) but does allow lay testimony of mental
condition.

Furthermore, Feltman’s proposed reading 0f the statute completely subverts

meaning and

intent.

The

statute allows defense expert opinion

13

its

only after notice and an

allowance for the

state t0

conduct its

own evaluation and t0 secure its own expert testimony.

That Whole construct would be subverted
done, have the evaluator

tell

if the

defense could merely have an evaluation

the defendant the results of the evaluation, and then put the

defendant 0n the stand to testify about those results while avoiding any meaningful
opportunity

LC.

§

by

the state t0 get a second opinion.

The

district court

did not err

by applying

18-207 t0 the issue of admissibility and concluding Feltman’s proffered mental

condition evidence

Even
ﬁrst time

if this

inadmissible.

Court were t0 apply the legal standards Feltman advocates

0n appeal, Feltman has shown n0

testimony that
I.R.E. 701.

was

is

A

error.

lay Witness

may

for, for the

offer opinion

“not based 0n scientiﬁc, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”

Under this rule, “a lay person is not qualiﬁed t0 give an opinion about a medical

diagnosis.” Bloching V. Albertson’s, Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 846, 934 P.2d 17, 19 (1997).

opinion that Feltman suffers from bi-polar disorder
0r other specialized knowledge.

The

district court

is

An

one that requires scientiﬁc, technical,

did not abuse

its

discretion

by excluding

mental health evidence including Feltman’s diagnosis.

Feltman argues “a lay witness can
‘alleged injuries’ if they ‘are 0f a

cause.

9”

common

0n

‘the cause

allow someone

Who

“fell

down some

(Ct.

of a medical condition’ or

nature and arise from a readily identiﬁable

(Appellant’s brief, p. 26 (quoting Dodge-Farrar V.

137 Idaho 838, 842, 54 P.3d 954, 958

felt

testify

Am.

App. 2002).) While

steps, landing

Cleaning Serv. C0.,
this rule

would

on a knee, and immediately

Inc.,

certainly

thereafter

pain in the knee, saw an open wound 0n the knee, and Within minutes 0r hours observed

that the

knee was swelling”

t0 testify “that the pain,

wound and

the fall,” Dodge-Farrar, 137 Idaho at 842, 54 P.3d at 958,

14

it

swelling were caused

by

does not support the conclusion

abused

that the district court

discretion.

its

Making a diagnosis

Feltman was

bi-polar,

in question, is not

based 0n

that

and explication of how

that affected his behavior

common

Opinion testimony 0n these topics requires specialized, expert

knowledge.

0n the night

knowledge.
Finally,

An

any error was necessarily harmless.

deemed harmless

if

a substantial right

is

“abuse of discretion

may be

In the case of an incorrect ruling

not affected.

regarding evidence, this Court will grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a
substantial right

of one of the

582, 590 (2010);

ml

parties.” State V. Shackelford,

I.R.E. 103(3)

150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d

(“A party may claim

error in a ruling t0 admit 0r

exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right 0f the party

(“Any

error, defect, irregularity, or variance that

disregarded”).

“To

I.C.R. 52

....”);

does not affect substantial rights must be

establish harmless error, the State

doubt that the error complained 0f did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”

PLker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806, 814 (2014) (quoting State
209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010)). “‘In other words, the error

ﬁnds

that the result

would be

the

same without

the error.”’

Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017) (quoting State

V.

m

must ‘prove beyond a reasonable

is

V. Perry,

harmless

State V.

150 Idaho

if the

Court

Montgomery, 163

Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598, 301

P.3d 242, 256 (2013)).
Felton sought admission 0f the evidence in question, regarding his mental
condition, only to rebut any inference that his behavior in the encounter With ofﬁcers and

the jailers

was

the product of intoxication. (8/29/18 TL, p. 119, Ls. 5-13 (evidence offered

as “an alternate explanation for

why

he’s acting that way”); p. 120, Ls. 8-15 (“if they’re

showing he’s acting crazy because he’s drunk, Ithink I can show he’s acting crazy because

15

he’s crazy”).)

Defense counsel speciﬁcally stated that the

defense need for the evidence “simply by proving
the evidence 0f intoxication based

The record thus

it,

per

was

establishes that the evidence

77 (charging

DUI

but they wanted to get in

admissible, if at

all,

all

p. 120, Ls. 9-12.)

for consideration

DUI charge, and was neither offered nor admissible

as relevant t0 the propelling bodily ﬂuids charge or the

p.

se,

could have avoided any

0n how he was acting.” (8/29/18 TL,

only of one 0fthe theories related t0 the

(E R.,

state

per se theory 0f the DUI charge.

under alternative under the inﬂuence and per se

theories).)

The per se theory of DUI was supported With evidence of a blood draw of .256 blood
alcohol content. (8/29/18 TL, p. 143, Ls. 14
the evidence in question

se theory of

DUI

was unrelated

—

p. 146, L. 18; State’s

to the bodily

Exhibit 2.) Because

ﬂuids charge and unrelated t0 the per

(Which was supported by overwhelming evidence), any error was

harmless beyond any reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment ofthe

DATED this 8th day 0f November, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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district court.
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